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Abstract 
Design thinking features in post-modern educational literature (Doll 1979, 1986, 1993; Kress 1996; 
Cope, & Kalantzis 2003) as a construct that purportedly enables educators to prepare students to deal 
with complexity and „super-complexity‟ (Barnett 1996; 2000; 2003; 2006) when they enter their 
professions. Although not explicitly stated, post-modern educational literature tends to stress the 
importance of systems thinking, critical problem solving, cognitive flexibility, abductive and connective 
reasoning as competences that prepare professionals to  also perform optimally within a post-modern 
cultural situation and in age of information and super-complexity.    
 
In 2010 the University of Johannesburg embarked on the implementation of what it terms its „Learning 
to Be Philosophy‟ (Gravett, Amory & van der Westhuizen 2008) and institution-wide initiative that 
attempts to position the University strategically within the higher education landscape of South Africa. I 
contend that it is a philosophy that stresses “operational performativity” (Barnett 2000:40) in producing 
a new kind of graduate; one that has the capacity to engage professionally with a world of super-
complexity through „being‟.  This institutional philosophy, a blend of constructivist and 
phenomenological theory, argues that learning is authentic or deep when a student embodies 
knowledge by producing it in complex learning situations.  Learning is understood, within the 
philosophy, beyond the scope of the transmission, consumption, processing of information but in terms 
of the application of conventional professional wisdom. It suggests that graduates, as professionals, 
need to be able to be durably adaptable and value learning as a lifelong enterprise (Barnett 2006: 59).  
 
My paper critiques the Learning To Be Philosophy in terms of Barnett‟s (2000: 127 -139) notions of the 
new university in the age of uncertainty. Drawing on the work of Donald Schön (1990), I argue first, 
that designerly thinking (Nigel Cross 2008, 2011) is a form of artistry that should play a crucial role in 
not simply preparing students to perform supercomplexity in their professions but to develop their 
capacity to show insight into apprehending and producing supercomplexity.  I argue that despite the 
importance of artistry to higher education, it cannot be taught because it is not strictly speaking a 
„competence‟ but a set of dispositions. My central hypothesis is that design thinking and artistry can, 
however, be learnt, as an interrelated set of appreciative dispositions that show understanding into the 
condition of supercomplexity. I argue implicitly that a situational, transformative, durational and 
dialogical pedagogy is required in order to realise artistry as a graduate attribute. A pedagogy of this 
kind would demand a radical revision of the traditional functions of the university educator.  
 




Background: Supercomplexity and the University of Johannesburg’s Learning 
to Be Philosophy 
This paper attempts to sketch out an argument for the importance of designerly thinking to the project 
of higher education in an age of supercomplexity.  It is written with the view to initiate a mid to long-
term empirical study that investigates the role design thinking is playing and can play in enhancing 
learning across Faculties in the University of Johannesburg (UJ).  Throughout my career as a visual 
arts and design educator I have always entertained the notion that a sectoral definition of design has 
generally prevented the higher educational community from embracing its potential for deep learning.  
The human capacity to design is an essential aspect of all learning. In this notion, I have been led 
primarily by the work of Gunther Kress (1996, 2003, 2006), Nigel Cross (2008, 2011), Donald 
Schön(1990), Felix Gauttari (1995), John Dewey (2005), Lev Vygotsky (1978) all of whom, in their own 
ways, understand learning essentially as that human capacity to design.      
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I believe that such an insight can become important for a university such as UJ because it is a 
relatively new institution that is openly grappling with the problems of defining itself as a new 
university. In many senses, the institution is tackling the task of designing its identity from scratch.  UJ 
is unique in the higher education landscape in the sense that it is attempting to forge a coherent post-
colonial educational identity within the context of the mix of vocational, professional and academic 
programmes that it provides. It is also attempting to define itself the within the context of the diverse 
institutional legacies from which it was forged.  I also believe that design thinking can play a powerful 
role in supplementing its institutional “Learning to Be Philosophy”.  
 
In 2010, the institution launched and rolled out its Learning to Be Philosophy.  I was lucky enough to 
participate in a series of pilot workshops offered to the Graphic Design Department by the Centre for 
Professional Academic Staff Development at UJ. The series of two workshops was designed to 
prepare the department for the development of its new Communication Design degree curriculum, and 
pedagogically for the intake of the first cohort of first year degree students in 2011. I therefore had a 
first-hand experience of the University‟s Learning to Be Philosophy.  This experience sparked off a 
personal engagement with the ideas embedded in the philosophy and in particular the work of the 
educational philosopher Ronald Barnett. This resulted in a paper delivered at the Teaching Excellence 
at the University of Johannesburg Conference entitled  Habitus and Reflective Practicum: Tensions 
Between Notions of Teaching and Learning In Design Education (Gray 2010) upon which this paper is 
largely based.  
 
The University of Johannesburg’s “Learning to Be Philosophy”: Performative 
instrumentalism in the constellation of production, self, emancipation.   
Three features stand out from UJ‟s Learning to Be Philosophy which are pertinent to my later 
discussion around the value of design thinking in the project of higher education.   
 
The first contention of the position paper of 2009 is that the role of the modern university is not to 
disseminate information but to facilitate understanding through the quality of discipline and profession-
related learning experiences it offers to its students. In making this insight, the philosophy draws on 
the work on “deep learning” by Jerome Bruner (as cited by Gravett, Amory, van der Westhuizen 2008: 
2), an educationalist, who, in some respects, like Paulo Friere (2005), maintains that authentic 
learning is not a question of dispensing and receiving content but facilitating authentic engagement 
with it. Bruner departs from Paulo Freire on the question of engagement in his assumption that 
authentic learning is simply an active and dialogical engagement on the part of student with 
knowledge constructs rather than with broader ethical and social justice concerns. It is left to the 
professional knowledge and wisdom of the educator to lead the student to “see” the world in a 
transformed way (Gravett, Amory, van der Westhuizen 2008: 3). The students lived experience does 
not feature prominently in this thesis on deep learning.  The position paper argues for a graduate who 
has been profoundly shaped by the disciplines in which they have been immersed by their educators 
in the course of their studies. A position such as this implicitly assumes that goal of “learning to be” is 
the construction of authentic professional identities (rather than the creation of emancipated human 
identities) and that this identity is the outcome of the ability of the educator to engage students with a 
deep knowledge of their own circumscribed field. The educator‟s responsibility lies in his/her ability to 
engage students in the disciplinary/professional paradigms and the related processes that will 
transform the student and, by extension, ultimately prepare them for “graduateness” (Barnett 2006:55) 
which ultimately means preparing them for the world of work.  In this sense, the “Learning to Be 
Philosophy” position paper implicitly positions the role of the university and its educators in 
professional-instrumentalist terms and situates its project within what Barnett (2000: 48, 56) would call 
“the constellation of production” and the “constellation of self”. The point is that the first aspect of the 
“Learning to Be Philosophy” argues within the framework of “instrumental performativity”.         
 
The second prominent feature of the philosophy is that it also attempts to transcend its own narrowly 
conceived instrumental performativity (highlighted above) by also positioning the university within the 
“constellation of emancipation” (Barnett 2000: 56).  Educators are encouraged, in the “Learning to Be 
Philosophy”, to focus on forming and transforming the identity and dispositions of the student.  But not 
any identity will do.  The dispositions, personal attributes of the student need to be geared up for a 
professional life which would mean a deep internalisation of the relevant “knowledge domain” (Gravett, 
Amory, Van der Westhuizen 2008: 2 - 3) as well as the attendant outcomes that mark out professional 
identity in an age of supercomplexity including cognitive flexibility, the ability to transfer of skills, critical 
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thinking skills and so on.  The dispositional emphasis of the argument suggests that the kind of 
professional identities that need to be forged are those that have the capacity to see own identities as 
unique and incomplete, identities that require a “lifelong” learning in order to be effective within their 
respective professional domains (Gravett, Amory, Van der Westhuizen 2008: 4). As a catch-all term, 
“being” is underscored by both the harder performative dimension of professional life (skills, 
competence, technical capacity) and the new softer demands that are being placed on professionals 
today (ethics, cognitive flexibility, understanding etc). But ultimately here, “being” (despite the 
emancipatory rhetoric of the position paper) is largely framed in terms of the transmission, 
internalisation and performing of, again, professional “domains of knowledge”.    
 
The final aspect of the philosophy relates to curriculum design and it is here that the philosophy 
suggests that it is primarily entrenched in the “constellation of knowledge [production]” (Barnett 2000: 
48-49).  It is good and well to imagine a new kind of “graduatedness” but how does the university go 
about creating this outcome?  What is the transformative/experiential pedagogy and curriculum that is 
required  to realise the capacities required above? Drawing on the work of Johan Muller (2008), the 
philosophy offers a distinction between “conceptually” and “contextually” oriented curricula (Muller 
2008:33). This distinction asks educators, programme and curriculum designers to be mindful of the 
fact that learning and knowledge formation in their respective disciplines must necessarily assume 
different forms. The student‟s deep engagement with knowledge domain must be highly structured 
and thus the curriculum must take either a “contextual” slant (where knowledge gains purpose and 
legitimacy only within bounded situations) or “conceptual” slant (where knowledge is built in 
conceptual sequences or scaffolded).  The adoption of Muller‟s ideas within the context of 
instrumentalism suggested above shows a favouring of a particular cognitivist view where knowledge 
structures are seen as stable, apriori, disinterested and ultimately detached from the student‟s frame 
of reference.   
 
In many senses, this values contained in this philosophy mark out the attempt, by a young university 
(and it must be added, one with a technicist and conservative legacy) to distinguish itself from its 
competitors by focussing on a quality of „innovative‟ and „excellent‟ teaching that it envisages will 
produce better results under a new set of societal conditions of uncertainty and supercomplexity. In 
terms of Barnett‟s constellations of roles for the university, what is strikingly absent is an emphasis on 
critique and democracy. The implicit focus on production, self and emancipation is fitting for a 
university that has generally focused on vocational training. It make sense, given what I have argued 
above, that UJ in its advertising, calls prospective applicants to “be what you want to be”. What needs 
to be asked, however is why the “Learning To Be Philosophy” focuses on the operative/instrumental 
performativity in the notion of “being”?  
 
Supercomplexity: the end of knowledge and the crisis of higher education 
 [t]he point of this excursion into knowledge production is to underscore the larger point about the 
dissolving university.  The university has dissolved in a double sense. Firstly, we can no longer 
understand the university as a unity in itself: it has dissolved into segments, many in which in turn are 
interpolated in a wider society. Secondly, Knowledge has dissolved into knowledges. The inner sense of 
there being available a single story of its knowing efforts- captured under such descriptions as objective 
knowledge or propositional knowledge or anything else – can no longer seriously be entertained.  Now 
we are faced with knowledges, plural, sustained through different complexes of knowledge processes 
(Barnett 2000:17).  
 
Barnett (1996:21 -24) makes the claim that higher education is in crisis because it can no longer 
continue to occupy the constellations of production, emancipation, critique and democracy that it 
traditionally occupied.  Critically, in the face of the supercomplex challenges that it faces (and which 
are largely of its own doing) and the post-modern situation in which it finds itself in, university must 
take on board, in the most fundamental way, new conceptual coordinates; those of “uncertainty, 
unpredictability, changeability, contestability” (Barnett 2000:63). According to Barnett (1996:39 -44), 
because of the changing nature of knowledge itself, the university is forced into a situation where it 
cannot just continue to simply produce knowledge, transform existing identities, engender freedom, 
and instill a culture of critique. Rather it must provide insight into the condition of supercomplexity itself 
and at the same time play the critical role of producing it.  This requires a radical rethinking of both the 
traditional and modern forms of the university which I later contend design thinking has a great deal to 
offer.         
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It makes sense for an institution such as the University of Johannesburg to develop a „teaching 
philosophy‟ that attempts to be responsive to the shifting landscape of higher education because, as 
Barnett points out, the very concept of higher education is in a crisis of “responsiveness” (Barnett 
1996:  20 -24), “dissolution” and “attenuation” (Barnett 2000: 20). The shift from an industrial to a post-
industrial society has meant that knowledge, knowledge production and by extension learning itself 
has become “dispersed”. Because of this, the university can no longer claim to be the sole custodian 
and/or disseminator of knowledge. However, this is not only a problem of knowledge dispersal. The 
very foundation of knowledge is in question. As a result the university cannot lay claim to either 
monopolising knowledge or employing knowledge or understanding as a catalyst for the 
transformation of existing identities (whether professional or other). However, this is not to say that its 
role as a knowledge producer has been reduced. The university must now also assume the 
“responsibility” (Barnett 2000: 78) of facing its “fragility” (Barnett 2000: 65) and accept its function as a 
vital organ in ensuring the survival and functioning of the “learning society” by regulating, monitoring 
and producing the very conditions of supercomplexity that it played a role in making in the first place.  
 
Barnett (2003: 45) suggests that the post-modern university has, by and large, not risen to the 
challenge of the learning society and the societal shift to supercomplexity.  It has responded to this 
shift by simply becoming an institution “in society and not an institution of society” (Barnett 1996: 22).  
As a result of an unwillingness to engage seriously with the new epistemological condition of 
uncertainty, the higher education institution has found itself in a position where it has mostly lost its 
autonomy and, given the vacuum of value in its own institutional culture, it has become increasingly 
regulated and controlled by external agencies such as the state, the workplace and the market. These 
external agencies seek to make higher education accountable to its own interests under the veil of 
those of „society‟ (Barnett 1996: 43).  
 
But what is supercomplexity? The term can be understood in both a superficial instrumentalist sense 
and a more serious hermeneutic sense. Superficially, supercomplexity seems to suggest, on the one 
hand, that information, data and knowledge can be conflated.  A more substantial and radical claim is 
that post-modernity (putting supercomplexity aside for a moment) has effected a dramatic change in 
the very status and character of knowledge.  In the first, more superficial understanding of 
supercomplexity, the university must now accommodate the dubious claim that knowledge „doubles‟ 
every few years, it „grows exponentially‟, becomes „outdated‟, it „multiplies‟ and „proliferates‟ and so on.  
How does the traditional, academic university assimilate the view that knowledge is perhaps nothing 
but information or data that can be commodified, measured, bounded and parcelled out when 
traditionally it has taken the view that knowledge and truth were stably related?  Within the view 
knowledge-as-information, the role of the university is not so much to conserve and transmit stable 
bodies of knowledge or to facilitate the pursuit of truth but rather to build the student‟s capacity to 
control and manage the proliferation of information and data.  Concepts such as the „knowledge 
society‟, the „information age‟ offer a model of human understanding that departs radically from the 
university‟s deeper conception knowledge as a pathway to critique, emancipation, understanding and 
greater consciousness.  Knowledge is reframed, within the information age, as something that is both 
quantitatively objectifiable -„out there‟, fixed, attainable an exchangeable commodity, 
“educational/cultural capital” (Bourdieu & Passeron 71 - 106), largely instrumental- and as a qualitative 
essence -a capacity, a relation, a construct.  The point is that in the more superficial sense, 
supercomplexity, knowledge is understood within narrowly technicist and instrumental terms 
(knowledge as „know-how‟).  However, the more serious challenge comes from the post-modernist 
view that the very frames under which knowledge is recognised, constructed and apprehended are 
themselves contestable which results in the conditions of supercomplexity.   What is clear from both 
definitions of supercomplexity is that knowledge as a path to disinterested truth is no longer the source 
from which the university can claim its legitimacy. So where can it find its legitimacy?    
 
Barnett argues that the crisis of knowledge in higher education makes it more rather than less 
susceptible to cooptation by instrumentalist reason or the logic of late capitalism. In its inability to deal 
with the serious epistemic threat posed by post-modernism and the learning society, higher education 
has fallen prey to an empty relativism that can only lead it down two roads. Either it takes the road of 
late capitalist instrumentalisation and operationalisation or it takes down the road where it succumbs 
to an internal schizophrenia. Here, the university attempts to hold on to both its own internal criteria or 
values (academic competence) or those values imposed from the outside (operational competence) 
(Barnett 1996: 159).  Accepting the second road of laissez-faire relativism would mean that a gulf of 
value opens up: “the university has no responsibility to uphold a larger universe of value” and because 
Extracted from the Sixth International DEFSA Conference Proceedings 
© Copyright 2011 by the Design Education Forum of Southern Africa (www.defsa.org.za) 114 
it is “unsure of its value basis” external criteria come to dominate it.  By virtue of this lack it must 
surrender academic autonomy and the wisdom, insight and understanding associated to this to 
competence, skill and measureable outcomes. In other words, under the spectre of post-modernity 
and supercomplexity, the university is forced into a situation where it must relegate the traditional 
value of knowing-for-its-own-sake (Knowledge), for forms of capitalist “instrumental knowing” 
(knowledge); or knowledge derived from the state, the market place and the world of work (Barnett 
1996: 40).  
 
Finding its unifying traditional and modernist narratives collapsing under its feet, the university is 
forced into a situation where it must accept and favour forms of knowledge “that can be wrought upon 
the world with calculable and predictable effects, effects that are measurable” (Barnett 2000: 24)- 
„outcomes‟- for want of a better alternative. However, in its surrender, it cannot entirely dispense with 
its traditional roles because it “fears a position in which it becomes simply a dependent variable, 
yielding up to an economy and to the consumer those gifts that they demand”.  As I will argue in the 
next section, under the sign of its instrumentalisation and operationalisation and in the face of the 
crisis of knowledge that it refuses to acknowledge, the university comes to assume two contradictory 
roles. The result of a split in its personality means that the university comes to stand, in a post-modern 
situation, as both a reproductive and transformative apparatus which are two ethical positions that it 
cannot reconcile (Barnett 2000: 28).   
 
The split personality of higher education: an education for insight and 
understanding or an education for competence?  
This value split in the personality of the university is important because it manifests itself in the 
teaching and learning practices that take place within it and the values that the university assigns to 
the learning process itself. The two value positions, set out by Barnett (2000: 40): the “dialogic-
collegiality” position and the “performative-instrumental” position logically come to be manifest in both 
the structure of curricula and in the pedagogical strategies that educators use to realise their 
objectives. The two “hidden” institutional ideologies may effectively split the professional identity of the 
educator in two. The educator may not be able to reconcile (either ethically or conceptually) two 
radically misaligned approaches to human learning. Barnett terms these opposing educational 
positions the “understanding/insight” approach and the “competence/outcomes” approach to teaching 
and learning.    
 
Clearly, for Barnett, the competence approach is patently inappropriate to the task of higher education 
in an age of supercomplexity for a number of reasons. Barnett (1996: 69 - 82) criticises a competence 
approach to higher on both an ideological and practical level. Ideologically speaking, an education for 
competence makes serious assumptions about human nature and indeed the nature of learning and 
the character of knowledge itself. The mechanistic nature of outcomes and competence statements 
threaten individual autonomy (subjectivity) and collective agency (intersubjectivity) in their closure.  
Outcomes negate a “genuinely open, interactive forms of reason and engagement [...] in which there 
are no outcomes” (Barnett 1996: 78). Pragmatically speaking, it may be asserted that because we live 
in a world where the status of knowledge is rapidly changing the kind of competences that the 
university and the workplace requires from students “cannot be specified in advance” (Barnett 1996: 
75).  Aside from the inappropriacy of outcomes for dealing with the contingency and contestability of 
professional knowledge, competence education tends to valorise observable skills without entertaining 
the fact that even the most rudimentary skilfulness or technical ability requires deep understanding. 
Even the lowest order competence must be developed on a foundation of understanding and further 
through the situational application of knowledge and reflection-in-action. An education centered on 
technical rationalism or „skills development‟ thus ultimately debases both knowledge and 
understanding.  In competence education, knowledge is instrumentalised and valuable only in so far 
as it can be embedded in “skill” that is relevant only because it can serves the interests of capital. 
What counts is not that which functions to further human understanding for its own sake but that kind 
of „embedded knowledge‟ which can be instrumentalised and put to work. Competence or “know how” 
thus represents, for Barnett and others (Lum 1999), an “impoverished view of human action in which 
individuals are caused to perform against external standards”, where the human individual is “no 
longer the author of their own action” (Barnett 1996: 77) .  With this in mind, competence can only be 
practically imagined as the most mechanistic and superficial form of learning that cannot meet either 
the needs of the post-industrial workplace (flexibility, transferability, critical thinking skills) or traditional 
academia.  More pertinently competence education can be criticised as essentially anti-democratic 
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and insidiously authoritarian because it claims a certain universalism for the outcomes at the core of 
its curricula (Barnett 2003: 75).         
   
For Barnett (1996: 99- 111), “understanding” (a traditionally academic competence) is far better 
attuned both to the traditional values of the university and the new operational pressures placed upon 
it by a supercomplex, post industrial economy. The development understanding, insight and wisdom 
must remain the paramount virtues for the project of higher education because these values are better 
equipped to produce insights into supercomplexity and the means to produce it. An education 
centered on understanding can achieve this because it embodies the paradox of learning and thus 
resonates strongly with the key qualities of an age of uncertainty.  Understanding is paradoxical 
because although it strives for closure it has no end. It is uniquely individual- “there is no 
understanding only an understanding”. However, at the same time understanding is both intensely 
individual and inherently social. Understanding, given its interpersonal/interdiscursive/intersubjective 
nature is thus simultaneously bounded and unbounded (Barnett 1996: 105) and because of this it “is 
active, it is an engagement, is a form of agency and self expression. It is an expression of individuality 
and it strikes against the conventionalisation of competence. For Barnett, understanding becomes 
political because it challenges convention: “developing understanding is a subversive activity” (Barnett 
1996: 105). An understanding approach is invaluable to higher education and the world of commerce 
and society because its dialogic potential presents students with the cognitive, appreciative 
dispositions and resources that are required not so much to deal with knowledge per se as with the 
changing character of knowledge itself. If knowledge does not exist, in a post-modern situation, 
understanding can provide students which insight derived from “knowledge processes in different 
knowledge settings, exploiting knowledge possibilities” (Barnett 2000:18).   
 
This tension between competence and understanding, for me, lies at the heart of the problem of UJ‟s 
Learning to Be Philosophy. It strikes me as ironic that an institution can promulgate at the same time 
an education centered on competence (in its operations) and education based understanding (in its 
philosophy). Educators, are encouraged, through the institutional philosophy, on the one hand, to 
attend to the tremendous importance of understanding and wisdom in preparing students for a world 
of supercomplexity but are also required to realise this ambition through a competence approach to 
the curriculum.  If higher education, generally, clearly suffers from the disorder of split self how can it 
realise itself amid the conflicts between instrumental reason and hermeutic/critical reason?  
 
An epistemic affair? Design thinking a new universal/university paradigm?  
In what sense, if at all, can the dissolved university retain a sense of unity of process, self-understanding, 
communicative powers and purposes (Barnett 2000: 18)? 
 
So far, I have argued that two sets of conflicting ideological interests threaten to suppress the 
realisation of a new university founded on “fragility” and “uncertainty” (Barnett 2000: 65, 69 -71). I have 
suggested that the way that the character of knowledge is understood (the episteme) lies at the heart 
of the problem of how the university begins to rethink its agency in an “age of uncertainty”. It is here 
that I contend design thinking can be of critical importance in moving beyond a simplistic competence 
model of learning in higher education.  
 
Design offers an alternative “conversational” and relational (Schön 1990: 15) account of knowledge, 
learning and understanding. Its approach is one that is one that is generally marginalised in the 
context of the university because its forms of knowing are perceived to deviate from propositional and 
instrumentalist reasoning which are forms that are favoured by the traditional and modern university 
respectively.  Design is possibly a form of praxis that possesses the ability to concretise multiple 
reflective, experiential and discursive frames in the production of abstract models and physical 
artefacts that encode within it a variety of human interests. Design suggests a view of knowing that is 
“abductive” (Cross 2011: 10) rather than deductive or inductive; one that is simultaneously actionable, 
propositional and critical and as such provides affordance to the learner‟s synthesis of uncertainty, 
unpredictability, changeability, contestability in a material form.  
 
Notably, complexity and indeterminacy has been frequently noted as a fundamental aspect of all 
design activity (Cross 2011: 12; Buchanan 1992: 10; Schön 1990: 18). I would perhaps add to this by 
suggesting that the ability to handle supercomplexity is the marker of both superlative design practice 
and exemplary professional practice in all domains and disciplines. Design marks a radical departure 
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from conventional forms of knowing because, within this paradigm, knowledge is neither „discovered‟, 
„understood‟, nor operationalised but made visible through the synthesis of competing and multiple 
human interests. Knowledge is seen within a design paradigm as an emergent property of the 
synthesis of pattern, structure and process (Capra 1997: 20).  Through the reiterative process of 
design, higher order systems are catalysed through synthesis. There is the potential to produce living 
systems by pushing a solution to the threshold of equilibrium or chaos (Doll 1993) where degrees of 
probability are entertained by the designer rather than the pursuit of truth, knowledge or certainty.   In 
the design process knowledge is both actionable (Schön 1995) and reflective.  It does not reside in 
any single component of the overall design but in the sum total of a system of relations and 
affordances which the designer manipulates in order to produce, what the design field, terms a 
“solution”.  Reasoning, in this process is said to be “abductive”, “tacit” (Polyani 2009) or “intuitive” 
(Cross 2011: 10), in the sense that propositional knowledge is not simply operationalised; hypothetical 
knowledge is not simply tested.  Rather, in the conversation between designer, the “situation” and the 
“materials at hand” (Schön 1990: 25) a range of human interests are united in a series of provisional 
truths that are then subjected by the designer to further processes of conjecture, refutation and 
synthesis.  In this sense, the activity of design, like learning is radically indeterminate and situational. 
Design, as the exemplar of the learning process itself (Dewey as cited by Schön 1992: 120) suggests 
that learning is always motivated by the interplay of a variety of human interests.  
 
Barnett (1996: 146), drawing heavily on the work of Habermas, is able to define the interests that 
should shape higher education (hermeneutic and emancipatory interests as opposed to the 
dominance of scientistic interest) but he is unable to articulate the kinds of teaching and learning 
practices and methodologies that would fully realise it.  He sees three interests at play in the learning 
process: the scientistic, hermeneutic and emancipatory interests. In his conception, only the academic 
fields embedded in hermeneutic and emancipatory interests are capable of critical reflection because 
their forms of reason are inherently  open and self-regulating.  In partial agreement with Karl Popper‟s 
(and Kuhn‟s) criticism of the scientific field, Habermas posits that the scientistic or instrumental 
interests are the most closed and thus lack the capacity for authentic self-reflexivity. The sole interest 
of science as “a system of structured knowledge independent from the world” is in “predicting the 
workings of the environment […] and in controlling it” (Barnett 1996: 146).  In contrast to the scientistic 
interest in closure and control, human beings also have a hermeneutic interest in “comprehending 
each other and communicating with each other” which places understanding of the world for its own 
sake above putting it under human control. Because of the autonomous nature of hermeneutic 
interests “circles of interpretation” are “necessarily open and never conclusive” (Barnett 1996: 146).  
For him, the emancipatory forms of human interest supercede both instrumentalist and hermeneutic 
forms of human interest because it is premised on not “just controlling or comprehending the world” 
but “freeing human beings from their dependence upon it”. One may interpret this statement in Marxist 
terms as encapsulating a “science of the artificial” (Simon 1996) that dealienates human beings from 
society and nature.   
 
In Educating the Reflective Practitioner Donald Schön‟s proposes the notion that designerly thinking 
offers the potential to bridge a gap between propositional and actionable knowledge hinting at its 
capacity to reconcile multiple human interests and frames . He (Schön 1990: 15) argues that what 
differentiates the exemplary from the mediocre professional is their capacity to operate, in 
metacognitive terms, as a designer in situations of indeterminacy. Whether a professional is a 
musician, a psychotherapist, a lawyer, an architect, doctor: what defines exemplary practice in all 
fields is the extent to which a practitioner can show “artistry” or the the capacity to operate in situations 
of indeterminacy.  Practitioners who possess “artistry” can solve complex problems “ill-structured”, 
“messy” domains; or to use Barnett‟s term “complex” or “supercomplex” situations. Schön (1990: 13) 
models best practice in all professions on the activity of designers because their work foregrounds 
dialogue, improvisation and abductive logic. The highest form of design is where a practitioner is able 
to reflect on the frames of knowledge-in-action and reflect on the frames of reflection themselves 
(Schön 1990: 150). This is an idea that resonates strongly with Barnett‟s (2000: 18) notion of the 
importance of developing student dispositions that prepare them to understand “knowledge processes 
in different knowledge settings, exploiting knowledge possibilities”.   
 
Given the synthetic dimension of design, Schön (1990:18) logically places the teaching of artistry, or 
the designerly disposition at the center of all professional education. He maintains, moreover, that 
because learning in design is thoroughly dialogical it “cannot be taught by conventional classroom 
methods in terms of skills development or competence. But he does argue that artistry “can be learnt” 
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as a set of dispositions, in what he terms the “reflective practicum” (Schön 157 -168), a space that 
unites various forms of human interest within it.  For Schön (as cited by Waks 2001: 44), crucially, 
“design is learnable but not didactically or discursively teachable: it can be learned only in and through 
the practical operations of frame experimentation”.  
 
Conclusion: the new university and designing social futures 
Nigel Cross (2007 17- 18) suggests, in his seminal work, Designerly Ways of Knowing, that the 
university is generally split between scientistic interest (the Sciences) on the one hand and 
hermeneutic/emancipatory interest (the Humanities and the Arts) on the other. He contends that 
design supplies the third missing leg or I would argue the catalyst, as it were, to establish a dialogue 
between these two sets of dominant interests in higher education. If, as Barnett asserts, 
supercomplexity, in contrast to complexity, is when we are faced with situation in which the number of 
variables intrinsic to it and extrinsic to it, outstrips our capacity to understand the problem, then design 
may offer the capacity to re-imagine the project of higher education in an age of uncertainty.  Perhaps 
what Richard Buchanan (1992) has characterised as  “wicked problems” is simply the attempt on the 
part of all human beings to synthesise multiple and conflicting frames in the learning process.  
Perhaps what “abductive” logic and wicked problem solving points toward is that fact that design is 
essentially the activity of learning itself: synthesizing human interests and relations within specific 
contexts and situations for specific purposes. What design, as a paradigm of learning, offers to higher 
education is that it through it the multiple and conflicting cognitive frames that produce situations of 
supercomplexity can become visible and thus open to contestability. Design provides the opportunities 
to visualize operable and epistemic frames in real time and space. In the design process, there is, so 
to speak, no „knowledge‟ as such, only frames of interest and affordance which is a radically different 
take on the epistemological crisis facing higher education. Design is, in short, what human beings do 
when faced with situations of uncertainty or with intractably conflicting sets of interests. Perhaps a 
credible higher education for the 21
st
 century would equip students with the wherewithal to actively 
“design their social futures” (Kress et al1996: 71).  
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